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“But since the affairs of men rest still uncertain, let’s reason
with the worst that may befall”1
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1 Introduction
This article is a commentary on the verdict of the “L’Aquila Six”, the group
of bureaucrats and scientists tried by an Italian court as a result of their
public statements in advance of the quake of 2009 Apr. 6 that left the
city in ruins and cause more than 300 deaths.3 It was not the worst such
catastrophic event in recent Italian history, but it was one of – if not the –
worst failures of risk assessment and preventive action. The six were found
guilty and condemned by a first level of the justice system to substantial
prison terms. The outcry provoked by the verdict in the world press and the
international scientific community has fueled the already fiery debate over
whether the six should have been tried at all. They have been presented as
martyrs to science being treated as scapegoats by a scientifically illiterate
justice system and inflamed local population for not being able to perform
the impossible (predict the event). Petitions of support have been drafted
and signed by thousands of working scientists and technical experts in many
fields excoriating the court and the country for such an outrage against the
scientific community, often accompanied by ominous warnings about the
chilling effect this will have on the availability of expert advice in times of
need.
1 Wm. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 5, Sc. 1
2To be published in 2012, ScienzaePace, the journal of the Interdisciplinary Center for
Peace Studies (Centro Interdisciplinare Scienze per la Pace), University of Pisa
ISSN 2039-1749 (http://scienzaepace.unipi.it/ ). Sincere thanks to Giorgio Gallo, Fabio
Del Sordo, Ivan De Gennaro Aquino, Alessandro Cilla, and Matteo Cantiello for valuable
comments and discussions.
3Detailed analyses of the seismic event is provided by D’Agostino, N. et al. 2012,
J. Geophys. Res., 117, B02402; Gallovic, F. and Zaradnik, J. 2012, J. Geophys. Res.,
117, B04307; Ameri, G. et al. 2012, J. Geophysical Res., 117, B04308. These together
provide a comprehensive summary of the event from the geophysical side. For general
information about earthquakes and analysis, see the US Geological Survey Earthquakes
Hazard Program website.
1
My purpose here, to state it at the outset, is to explain why this view
of the events of the trial is misguided, however well intentioned, and misin-
formed.
To begin with the same affirmation that began the trial, that of the pub-
lic prosecutor (procura), everyone knows you can’t predict an earthquake,
especially one like this. That was not the motive for the indictment. The six
– and the head of civil defense at the time – were guilty of making false, de-
liberately misleading statements that were intended to calm the public in a
time of increasing alarm and that caused imprudent actions – incautious ac-
tions – based on their expert statements. The case has one benefit, however:
it has shown a spotlight on a fundamental issue that the academic and re-
search communities have often ignored – the responsibility to communicate
clearly, frequently, and directly with the public at large.
2 Probability and risk in brief
Reporters, both immediately before and even long (years) afterward, bandied
about quantifications related to the l’Aquila earthquake and its likelihood.
In many reports quoted a probability for this event, most cited a value of
less than 0.001 percent. But let’s examine, for a moment, what this means
– both for the prediction itself and for the impression such a quantification
gave to an uninformed public.
2.1 Probabilities of events
If you deal a deck of cards, or throw dice, the events are independent (as-
suming honesty on the part of the player) and therefore these probabilities
can be predicted by simple frequencies, the number of combinations that can
occur and the number of ways a particular hand, or throw, might devolve.
For most people, this is as close as they ever get to probabilistic reasoning.4
The same is true for lotteries, or any other form of honest gambling;
it suffices to know the frequencies. But that assumes two things. First,
that the distribution is complete (the information is complete, for example,
when you know how many cards you have in a deck) and that the underlying
process is a set of independent, completely random events that will occur
with the same distribution each time.
On the other hand, consider the physical world – not the casino. An
earthquake is a complex series of events, not simply a piece of rock that
waits until the “proper moment” to slip out of place. Each event is con-
ditioned by the history of each locale, and being an intrinsically complex
structure, the crust of this planet is quite variable in its mechanical and
4A cure for this is Jaynes, E. T. 2003, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press).
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chemical properties. The same rock, subject to different conditions of ten-
sion, groundwater, heating, and large scale stresses (e.g. plate tectonics,
the movements of the large scale crust) will have different reactions to small
changes. More important, each piece is in contact with its surroundings
whose properties may not be known with such pinpoint accuracy as, say,
the location of a card in a shuffle (for instance, done by a good magician).
The Earth has been surveyed by geologists in more or less detail, depending
on the location, but only for the past century. Except when a deeper portion
has been exposed, often by a violent event such as a landslide, earthquake,
or mountain building, or probed by wells or mining, the subsurface is only
a reconstruction based on the “boundary”. In some cases, this can be done
with enough certainty that predictions can be made of the presence of faults
and cracks, rupture zones, and stressed regions within hundreds of meters.
In others, the number of samples covering a surface sampling is much coarser
and only reveals structures tens of kilometers in size. The deeper you want
to go, the more “fuzzy” the picture becomes. So you don’t necessarily even
know what cards are in the shuffle when you try to predict a hand.
Now we come to the next, more serious problem. The so-called “gambler’s
fallacy” is the belief that a string of recurrences is informative – the same
card appearing in successive deals or a coin that has been tossed with a run
of identical results – increases the chance that the next event will be the
same. But in a random process that is independent that is not true. You
still have the same frequency-dependent outcome, it’s simply that the run
has not yet been long enough to see the alternate outcomes. That is not
the case with many triggered events. Just because you have a probability
of, say, 50% that a coin will come up heads does not mean you can’t have
a run of twenty heads. It is simply unlikely for a fair coin. But the best
bet for the next toss should still be based on the 50% assumption. This
is what is called, in statistics, a Gaussian process. It has a mean value
and a range, and that’s it. On that basis you can predict what the chance
of a particular string of events might be but not any single event: there
is no history or memory. Rocks are different! They have a “memory”,
the deformations and alterations of the past change the behavior for the
future and this leads to extreme events happening with far higher chance
than would be expected from a Gaussian process. The example proffered
by economists for this is the high frequency of stock market crashes (the
bread-and-butter of econophysics) but there is a lesson to be transferred to
earthquakes and other natural catastrophes. If something has occurred in
the past, it changes the likelihood that it may occur in the future. This is
not a probability that is well understood, either at the technical level – it is
a central question for a very large range of disciplines – not by the public at
large.
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2.2 The perception and assignment of risk
Ultimately, any calculation or analysis that produces a quantitative interval
of confidence in a prediction, passes to a second level – the interpretation or
qualitative assessment of risk – when viewed in the advisory context. Note
that here we enter the murky territory of perception.5
What may seem highly unlikely to one person may, instead, seem in-
evitable to another. The translation is no different than between languages,.
To be effective, it must capture the sense, the essential content, without dis-
tortion but it never is – nor can it ever be – unique. In general, the on
of the weakest aspects of Western education is the almost complete lack of
statistical reasoning. Not that the public isn’t awash in “statistics” , every
human activity from calcio to politics to economics is “quantified” by the
media and, by exposure and acquired habit, to individuals. But the meaning
of both these quantifications and their attendant uncertainties is rarely, if
ever, explained. We will return to this point in the next section.
In assessing risk for natural catastrophic events, the details are devilishly
important and these cannot be completely known. That is why models are
used for predictions, and why the assumptions of the models have to embody
the relevant uncertainties. One never, for instance, runs one atmospheric
model to predict weather, it is an ensemble of models and a range of inputs
(i.e. measurements, real data) with all of their associated measurement
uncertainties. To be precise, when a meteorologist cites a “chance of rain”
it means that a range of model runs gave that outcome and/or that the
approximate conditions will occur that have, in the past, produced such an
event. Such assessments may be purely statistical and historical (although
for meteorology they are not now on a daily basis but are on the seasonal
or annual level) but for earthquakes they must be much more often based
on the historical data.6
It is this that makes the public statements particularly delicate. They
cannot be absolute, they are based on evaluation of contextualized data. A
single event may be meaningless, a train of events will have far more infor-
mation, and a comparison with historical series becomes even more informa-
tive. The hypotheses of risk are, consequently, modified as more information
comes in and cannot be made definitive. Instead, and this is another lesson
learned from the weather, trends are especially significant. In the L’Aquila
quake, the normal seismicity of an active region was known from monitoring
for decades. A few extreme events in that case, not clustered in time, would
be a cause for increased attention but might – with an emphasis on might
5Some excellent commentaries on this issue, directed to engineers by engineers, are the
books by Samuel Florman and Henry Petrosky.
6For a good example, related to hurricane risk assessment and communication, see
Demuth, J. L. et al. 2012, Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 93, 113. The same applies
to tornado warnings and other extreme weather, and the validity of long-term weather
forecasting.
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– not indicate anything special. But, if there is a trend, or a cluster, the
possibility that the conditions could be changing cannot be excluded and
the caution level should increase. In the face of public concerns, to say that
there is nothing to worry about is both completely meaningless and impos-
sible. To say that the changes might call for increased caution is reasonable
and supported by the data. In this case, the secular trend of the frequency
of larger shocks was a clear sign that there might be a change – note, not
an event – in course.
3 Communication of risk
If all this background seems obvious, it is not. This was not communicated
to the public.7
3.1 The message
Consider one press reaction to the l’Aquila Six verdict. Citing the prediction
by California seismologists that there was a 95% chance of an earthquake
occurring in a specific portion of the San Andreas fault, one of the most
dangerous sites in North America for devastating tremors, within eight years,
one commentator noted “and they were wrong”. What does that remark
mean? Nothing! They neither were, nor could be, wrong. If something has
a chance of happening it does not mean it will. And 95%, while it seems
a good outcome for an election, is hardly reassuring from any statistical
point of view. It is, in fact, a statement of uncertainty and could just as
easily be quantified as “some” chance. But for quantification, it is what
comes out of predictive models. The comment, instead, made the correct
scientific statement into something it was neither intended to be nor could
be, a certainty.8
If an event cannot be predicted with certainty, neither can its opposite be
certain – that something will not happen. Probability assessments of risk run
both ways. Therefore it is imperative to properly nuance, with explanation
in non-technical language the context for any statement. Reporters often
behave stupidly at this point, impatient and bored with details they don’t
want to understand. It is far easier to ask ludicrously direct yes/no questions
than wait for a reasoned reply. Nonetheless, it is the scientists’ obligation
to persist in forcing the proper telling of their story, to insist that they be
correctly quoted and to vigorously hound – and correct – those who distort
their message.
7A classic report by the American National Academy of Sciences is still as valuable as
when it was written in 1989, Improving Risk Communication (accessible online through
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=1189
8For an excellent resource letter, now rather old (2006), see
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/publications/informer/infrmr2/pubhazbib.pdf
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3.2 The method
The scientific method, such as it is, is founded in doubt and anomaly. Doubt
in that any results must be scrutinized, not believed. This also extends to
the individual scientist. If the ideas of others are to be questioned, so must
our own. And when we make a statement, whether about a research result
or – as in this case – a potentially important public issue, we must do so
with the conviction that we are possibly wrong. No matter how expert a
scientist may be, the world is neither linear nor simple and expertise in one
area may be blind to knowledge and even contradictions in another. That’s
where anomaly enters. We never see the world ‘as it is”, that’s why we have
models. These function as a way of ordering phenomena. But they also
function as filters, even blinkers. The models may, if not used cautiously
and skeptically, become the reality. This is certainly true for the general
public that knows only the pronouncements, the results, without knowing
the reasoning behind it. That’s as much the fault of the scientists as it is
the media. It isn’t merely a question of ”science education” or even ”public
outreach”. The former can degenerate into ”literacy” (whatever that has
come to mean) or almost creed. The latter all too often merely publicity, an
attempt to propagandize and entertain the non-scientists with “wonderful
discoveries”. Instead, critical thinking – doubt – is often missing from either
sphere, even less present when the communication and teaching are left to
interpreters who are themselves specialists only in “communications”. We
have seen the disastrous effects of this in business, the “creed” of the CEO
who knows how to manage without needing to know the why or how for
the entity being managed. To be aware that conditions are departing from
the norm, or from expectations requires analysis and testing, debate and
skepticism.
3.3 Cases: poor or false
Look at the reporting on the predictions in Italy during the storms of the
week of 8 to 12 November 2012. This was not the “cousin of hurricane
Sandy”, nor was that storm a frankenstorm. The press, sensationalizing be-
cause it’s their “craft”, created an expectation far beyond the reality and
was irresponsible. This is not a freedom of the press issue. Those who are the
intermediaries between the sources (“experts”) and the receivers (“the pub-
lic” and officials responsible for decision-making) can only interpret potential
risks based on the information provided and if that channel is distorted they
cannot calibrate that out. In communication theory, this comprises two ef-
fects: noise and distortion. Noise is whatever masks the signal but, with
a sufficient repetition (for instance) the original information is recoverable.
Distortion is far more insidious; it systematically changes the information
content so the original signal cannot be reconstructed. This second effect
risks the production of a back-reaction when little actual damage is suffered
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or the event turns out to be less than “predicted” (the quotes are impor-
tant). The next prediction may be seen as unreliable and, consequently,
ignorable.
For the l’Aquila Six, the issue was the contrary. The public was told
by the spokesperson for the commission whose task was to evaluate the
possibility of risk that there was nothing to worry about, that there was
no indication of anything unusual. More seriously, a false reason for calm
was introduced into the communication, the distortion that the public could
not evaluate. But there was, in principle, a check on this: the scientists
on the commission, who were in a position to verify the information being
transmitted to the public, could have spoken up immediately and provided
the relevant and necessary calibration to an otherwise uniformed audience.
They did not. The prosecution and verdict were for that collective negli-
gence. Nobody else was in a position to challenge the statements made in
the press conference, no one else had seen all of the details (in theory, at
this stage– mid-November 2012 – we do not know the sum of evidence ex-
amined). The minutes were written one week after the event and contained
nothing specific, quantitative, or precise. More damning was the pream-
ble that stated that the greatest experts were convened to assess the risk.
This displays a tremendous huberis on the part of the communicators who
drafted the document and the committee by giving their consent with their
signatures. It was designed to further the distortion of the signal.9
Testimony at the trial cited these calming affirmations of the commission
as the basis for decisions that led to tragic results. Residents of l’Aquila
testified that they changed their habitual reactions to seismic activity based
on the pronouncements of the commission. While nothing might have hap-
pened, a quake might not have occurred, that is contrafactual. It did. The
authorities might have been considered alarmists had there been an advisory
of caution to no effect, but nothing would have resulted from that and in
collective memory something would have been taken away from the event.
If both reporters and communicators at all levels had been careful to qualify
their too firm pronouncements, to explain the context of the advisory, it is
highly unlikely that there would have been a negative long-term effect in
the credibility of such predictions. But again, that is counterfactual in the
specific case of the l’Aquila catastrophe. Other events have been handled
according to this model procedure – volcanic activity, hurricane risk, flood
warnings, tsunami warnings (think of Hawaii, where tsunami warnings are
routinely received by the public with proper understanding and response) –
and they do not meet sketicism or cynicism on the part of the public.
9see e.g. Showstack, R. 2012, EOS, 93, 455, with links for the American Geophysical
Union.
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4 Coda
If something highly improbable, it is not absolutely impossible.10 In the
communication of risk, sufficient evidence and background must be provided
to permit the public, whoever they are, to understand the nuances of any
prediction. All predictions are provisional, and must be continually reviewed
and revised in light of new information and this too must be openly com-
municated.
4.1 Appendix: some useful websites
Here we include a small sample of the commentary now available on the
web. These reports have all appeared long after the verdict and reflect some
of the“rethinking”.
• http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/10/26/why-scientists-should-sometimes-be-on-trial/
• http://www.iaspei.org/news items/laquila IASPEI press release final.pdf
• http://www.nature.com/news/l-aquila-verdict-row-grows-1.11683
• http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/10/22/the-laquila-verdict-a-judgment-not-against-science-but-against-a-failure-of-science-communication/
• http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication files/2002.22.pdf
• http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/24/the-deeper-issues-behind-italys-conviction-of-earthquake-scientists/
• http://beforeitsnews.com/science-and-technology/2012/10/mischaracterizations-of-the-laquila-lawsuit-verdict-2484838.html
• http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/controversiesinscience
10Adams, D. 1980, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (NY: Harmony Books)
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